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ABSTRACT 
 
In order to achieve the goal of reaching a middle-income country status by 2021, Bangladesh 
requires increased public investment, particularly in order to close severe education, health, 
and infrastructure gaps. The major proportion of public investment in Bangladesh is channeled 
through the Annual Development Program (ADP).The government takes many projects every 
year for implementation in the ADP but a significant proportion of these projects are revised 
by cost escalation with time overrun as the implementation status remains poor. This study 
aims to assess and diagnose the ADP execution process against a sound public investment 
management framework, to identify the barriers responsible for poor implementation of ADP; 
and to recommend policy options to raise the efficacy of delivering ADP.  
The assessment of this study, using secondary data, found a weak project screening and 
appraisal status in the project preparation stage. This is supported by the finding of inadequate 
independent review of project proposals (e.g. log frames and CBA), as well as the practice of 
pervasive and increasing allocations to symbolic (small) projects and the substantial growth in 
the number of unapproved new projects.  
Although a significant improvement has been achieved in the ADP execution rate in 
the last two decades particularly for GOB projects (89 per cent), the execution rate of DP 
assisted projects (72 per cent) lags far behind. Furthermore, the evidence of fourth quarter 
syndrome suggests significant potential problems regarding the spending quality, and therefore 
the continued presence of project preparation and implementation weaknesses. In addition, the 
large share of projects which were declared completed despite not being 100 per cent complete 
indicates the necessity of reviewing and rationalizing quality of ADP spending. 
Two key indicators for evaluating the PIM system effectiveness are cost and time over-
run. While some the average cost overrun showed some improvement in recent years, the 
average cost overrun is still on an increasing trend. Weaknesses in project preparation, 
financing, and execution are likely to have contributed to such inefficiency.  
Finally, inadequate follow-up on the recommendations generated from external audits, 
as well as IMED impact evaluations and lack of attention to the operation and maintenance of 
newly created assets are the two other critically important factors which hamper the efficacy 
of ADP delivery of Bangladesh. Therefore, the currents study recommends that these 
weaknesses should be addressed in the short, medium and long term to increase the 
effectiveness of PIM system in Bangladesh. 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
A number of studies have already proven the positive association of public investment 
with economic growth (Chakraborty & Dabla-Norris, 2009; Ghazanchyan & Stotsky, 2013). 
The empirical result by Gupta, Kangur, Papageorgiou and Wane (2014) shows that public 
capital is a significant contributor to growth when adjusted for efficiency. This indicates that 
when efficiency of investment processes is controlled, the productivity of public capital 
exceeds the marginal cost of investment significantly. The IMF (2014) argues that investment 
can bring significant growth dividend, but the dividend will be lower in case of inefficient 
public investment. For example, the impact of public investment on economic output was found 
0.15 percentage point higher in the same year and 1.0 percentage point higher after four years 
in efficient advanced economies compared to the inefficient developing economies (IMF, 
2014). 
In order to achieve the goal of reaching a middle-income country status by 2021, 
Bangladesh requires increased public investment, particularly in order to close severe 
education, health, and infrastructure gaps (World Bank, 2011). The profitability or rate of 
return of private sector to invest in public goods and services such as education, health and 
basic infrastructures is low and as a result private investors are reluctant to invest in these public 
goods. In contrast, due to the expected social rate of return and addition to national income 
through productivity increase, public investment is the most preferred tool for the government 
to narrow the gaps in infrastructure and social sectors. However, the argument that additional 
resources allocated to public investment will increase the rate of economic growth can be 
negated by the weaknesses in the management of public investment.  
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The major proportion of public investment in Bangladesh is channeled through the 
Annual Development Program (ADP). Bangladesh has a dual-budgeting system – development 
budget and non-development budget (NDB). ADP constitutes more than 95 per cent of the 
development budget which finances investment projects and technical assistance projects while 
the on-going recurrent costs of government are financed by the NDB. Meanwhile, ADP fails 
to server its purpose of increasing economic growth and generating employment when its 
implementation is inefficient. Mujeri and Alam (2011) in their background papers for Sixth 
Five Year Plan of Bangladesh 2011-2015 argues that the current project selection and 
implementation process, based on the ADP framework, has not been that much effective in 
meeting today’s demands and challenges. While the ADP model worked during the 1970s and 
the 1980s for meeting the investment demand of public infrastructure, when the country had a 
small domestic resource base and depended mostly on development assistance to finance its 
public investment program, it is no longer an adequate mechanism as has been increasingly 
apparent (Mujeri and Alam, 2011). Today the government depends less on foreign aid to 
finance its ADP while the availability of domestic resource is also not adequate to meet the fast 
growing physical infrastructure demand in the economy. Data from the Implementation 
Monitoring and Evaluation Division (IMED) of the Planning Commission shows that on an 
average only 38 per cent of ADP was financed from project aid (PA) during 2006-15 period 
which was 55 per cent in the 1990s. In addition, The Seventh Five Year Plan (7FYP) estimates 
that Bangladesh needs about USD 410 billion worth of physical infrastructure to grow at a rate 
of 8 per cent by 2020, which is twice the size of country’s current GDP (GED, 2015).  
Further, the size of ADP is increased by time overrun and cost escalation which 
deteriorate the quality of implementation as well as increase social cost. Time escalation causes 
more problems for projects that are financed through foreign aids as longer implementation 
period are associated with high rate of interest and the addition of a longer repayment schedule. 
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The government takes many projects every year for implementation in the ADP but a 
significant proportion of these projects are revised by cost escalation with time overrun as the 
implementation status remains poor. Kettlewell et al. (2014) attempts to analyze the quality of 
project execution by assessing the time and cost overruns on completed projects based on a 
sample of all 256 ADP projects provided by IMED which were all closed in FY2011. From 
this sample, 80 projects (31 per cent) were found to have overspent their original budget while 
167 (65 per cent) projects had a time overrun. The average cost of these projects increased by 
34 per cent and average execution period extended by 2.70 years or 76 per cent. The study also 
found that most projects with a cost overrun also encountered a time overrun (Ketttewell et al., 
2014). All these factors indicate towards the inefficient management of public investment of 
Bangladesh. Therefore, the demonstrated failure of the ADP-based project execution implies 
that the emerging needs of the economy that should grow at a rate of 8 per cent cannot be 
tackled through following the traditional way of financing and implementing infrastructure 
projects. In this respect, the current study can make potential contribution to policymakers in 
detecting the barriers to ADP execution and recommending policy measures to guarantee 
efficient delivery of ADP and thus ensuring proper utilization of public investment. 
This study aims to assess and diagnose the ADP execution process against a sound public 
investment management framework, to identify the constraints and weaknesses in the PIM 
system of Bangladesh; and to suggest policy measures to raise the efficacy of delivering ADP.  
1.2 Research Questions 
To fulfill the objectives, the current study will attempt to answer the following questions: 
 What are the features of a sound public investment management framework? 
 Does the execution of ADP in Bangladesh follow a sound public investment 
management framework? 
 What are the factors hampering the effectiveness of delivering the ADP in Bangladesh? 
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1.3 Research Methodology 
 Any study about the ADP implementation requires the answer of both macro and micro 
type investigation. This study used secondary data sources. A detailed review of national and 
international literatures relevant to the topic was conducted. Data were collected from 
published statistics, different research reports and government publications. Secondary data 
sources include ADP and ADP progress reports (English and Bangla), National Development 
Plans, annual reports of IMED, and other national and international research articles. 
The paper adopts a descriptive and elaborative way of presenting with some data 
analysis. The study is primarily based on qualitative assessment, but it also analyzes descriptive 
statistics using appropriate tools. 
1.4 Organization of the Paper 
This study is organized as follows. Following this introduction, chapter 2 reviews 
literatures, concepts and theories on public investment management. Chapter 3 assesses the 
ADP delivery process against a sound public investment management framework. Chapter 4 
concludes the study by summarizing the key constraints affecting the effectiveness of 
delivering the ADP and providing recommendations for raising the efficacy of ADP execution 
in Bangladesh. 
1.5 Limitation of the Study 
 The analysis and findings of the study were mainly based on secondary data sources. 
Due to limited time and resources it was not possible to collect primary data from Key 
Informants to cross-check the validity of our findings and other qualitative aspects. Therefore, 
the analysis was mainly restricted to data which were available either on electronic sources or 
other secondary studies. 
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CHAPTER 2  
REVIEW OF LITERATURES ON PUBLIC INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT 
 
Fiscal institutions have played a key role in ensuring efficiency of public investment 
performance. Empirical studies found positive association of weak institutions with higher 
investment levels, but also with greater expenditure volatility and lower infrastructure quality 
(Tanzi & Davoodi, 1997; Keefer & Knack, 2007; Grigoli & Mills, 2014). In contrast, strong 
institutions are generally associated with higher efficiency in public investment and lower 
dependency on natural resource revenues (Albino-War et al., 2014). Gupta et al. (2014) also 
found that the quality of PIM is an important determinant of the productivity of public capital. 
Further, Dabla-Norris, Brumby, Kyobe, Mills and Papageorgiou (2012) developed an index on 
Public Investment Management (PIM) and observed that the efficiency and effectiveness of 
PIM varied widely across middle- and low-income countries. However, the index could not 
evaluate all public investment related key institutions due to its reliance on secondary-data 
sources. 
2.1 Defining Key Features for an Efficient PIM System  
The literature on the practices of PIM highlighted that well-governed institutions are 
critically important at key stages of the investment cycle (Balassone & Franco, 2000; Dabla-
Norris et al., 2012; OECD, 2014; IMF, 2015). Using country experiences, Rajaram, Le, Kaiser, 
Kim and Frank (2014) identified “eight essential features” for achieving PIM efficiency. The 
rationale behind choosing Rajaram et al. (2014) as the main framework is that it deals with 
each stages of project cycle and therefore more comprehensive as a diagnostic assessment 
framework than other relevant literatures. The following subchapters will describe and justify 
each of these features.  
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2.1.1 Guidance to investment, development and preliminary screening of projects. 
A vital approach to guide policy makers toward country priorities is the broad strategic 
planning for public investment. Balassone and Franco (2000), Creel, Monperrus-Véroni and 
Saraceno (2007), and Schaechter, Kinda, Budina and Weber (2012), discussed the importance 
of effective, integrated strategic planning for guiding public investment at the national and 
subnational level. A national development plan or other medium to long-term strategic 
document that comprises economy wide development priorities can provide such guidance. 
Examples of such guiding documents include, Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP); 
longer-term national vision documents; and sector-level or even subsector-level strategy that 
translate the overarching priorities in a detailed way. Rajaram, Biletska and Brumby (2010) 
stated that a credible strategic guidance to public investment, which can be meaningfully 
interpreted at sector or subsector levels, can also be used as a reference of instructions during 
annual budget preparation.  
Beyond the strategic guide, a formal process needs to be followed for project 
development as well as initial screening. A project profile with basic project information should 
be prepared by line ministries and implementing bodies commencing public investment 
projects (Rajaram et al., 2010). The basic project information includes “the relevant strategic 
priority and program or subprogram, the specific problem to be addressed, the project 
objective, the main activities, the expected results, and the estimated budget” (Rajaram et al., 
2014). At this stage, it is also important to consider options for addressing the problem 
associated with a project and to undertake demand, supply, and gap analyses. In addition, 
preliminary screening of all project proposals should be undertaken to ensure that they are (a) 
consistent with the strategic goals of government, and (b) eligible for inclusion as a project 
through budget classification test. A project should be rejected if it fails to meet this screening 
test, and no further evaluation will be required.   
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2.1.2 Formal appraisal of projects. 
Projects or programs should go through the feasibility test as part of appraisal of their 
viability that meet the first screening test (World Bank, 2011). This phase requires the spending 
agency or line ministry to assess whether a project should proceed further, once it has been 
found to be consistent with the priorities set by the government. A structured set of steps related 
to project preparation such as prefeasibility and feasibility studies (including primary design 
and impact assessments: social and environmental) are required in this process that must be 
completed and independently evaluated before approving a project for funding (Rajaram et al., 
2014). The prefeasibility study is undertaken before conducting a full-fledged feasibility study 
to identify relevant alternatives. The feasibility study compiles all relevant data obtained from 
the prefeasibility study, refines project outputs and outcomes, outlines and analyzes the 
selected alternatives in depth for achieving project objectives, and assesses numerous 
background information (Rajaram et al., 2010). Therefore, the scope of a project can be 
narrowed down through identifying an optimal option for preliminary design.  
2.1.3 Independent appraisal review. 
 It is always sound practice to conduct an independent review of project appraisals. 
Investment decisions can be skewed by optimism bias of those involved with developing 
project proposals which is reflected in underestimated costs and overestimated benefits 
(Rajaram et al., 2010). An independent peer review might be necessary where, instead of a 
central ministry, the appraisal is undertaken by departments and ministries, to check that the 
evaluation does not suffer from any subjective bias. The ministry of finance (MoF) or other 
designated institutions such as a university or a policy research institute with an independent 
relationship to government can perform this function (Rajaram et al., 2014). The appraisal of 
donor-financed projects should be similar to government-funded projects. However, it is 
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critically important to clarify specific responsibilities in case of aided projects as the appraisal 
system can be overburdened by a multiplicity of players with unclear accountabilities. 
2.1.4 Selection of projects and budgeting. 
A linkage between the process of appraisal and selection of public investment and the 
budget cycle is essential even though there exists a different timetable for the project evaluation 
cycle. In order to undertake a sustainable investment program, aggregate or sectoral public 
investment packages need to be established by the fiscal framework and the yearly budget 
(Fainboim, Last and Tandberg, 2013). Dabla-Norris et al. (2012) stressed the importance of 
medium-term budget frameworks, the unification of current and capital budgets, and 
consolidation of extra-budgetary funds to the effective allocation of investment to the most 
productive sectors. Much emphasis was put on having a medium-term framework because it 
creates a link between medium-term fiscal objectives or rules and national priorities. 
The keys to quality investment include good choices of investment, active asset 
portfolio management, and the flow of recurrent budget that ensures adequate funding for the 
operation and maintenance of existing assets (Rajaram et al., 2010). The flow of recurrent 
budget is particularly important for projects funded by donors that only create assets while 
government borne the expenses of operation and maintenance of those assets. Another 
important budgetary factor of efficient investment decision is whether the impact of the capital 
projects is reflected by recurrent budget adjustments. For instance, sources of funding the extra 
expenses that may be experienced during the maintenance and operation of existing assets 
should be considered. Hence, both the MoF and sector ministries should systematically review 
the future costs of investment projects, and their funding during budget preparation.  
Perhaps, the most critical stage of the PIM process is project selection because it is one 
of the stages of the investment cycle that is often the most contentious. Typically a lot of 
pressure is exerted on project selection agencies and committees by political patrons for their 
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projects and high-level political intervention is sought to overlook any technical analysis that 
are not favorable (Rajaram et al., 2014). Ministries and departments also look for ways to strike 
deals to ensure the selection of the projects that stand beneficial for them. Private lobbyists and 
contractors will also work through both political and bureaucratic channels to influence the 
selection of the project in a hope to win the contractual right to construction. Therefore, 
existence of a strong gatekeeping function is critical to increase the credibility of the selection 
process and to ensure the rejection of wasteful projects. To prevent the vested groups from 
undermining this important stage of the investment process, a legislative backing for a 
gatekeeping function may help (Rajaram et al., 2014). Attempts to influence the selection 
process may also be limited through transparent disclosure of the project selection basis.   
2.1.5 Implementation of projects. 
A further scrutiny of projects that have been objectively appraised and selected for 
investment should be undertaken for implementation practicality. A realistic timetable with 
clear organizational arrangements should be included in the project design to guarantee the 
project implementation capacity. Dabla-Norris et al. (2012) and Flyvberg (2009) underscored 
that firm control of expenditures, efficient management of liquidity, regular reporting of project 
execution and arrangements of strong project management are some of the key factors that 
ensure the timely and cost-efficient delivery of investment projects. In order to manage and 
monitor the implementation of projects, developing effective action strategies such as efficient 
procurement plans and establishing institutional capacity is critically important. A government 
should ideally establish a system of total project cost management and multiyear budgeting for 
complex projects, anticipating the budgetary needs throughout the project implementation 
period (Rajaram et al., 2010).  
Procurement, although, is typically a difficult element of project implementation, needs 
to be addressed due to its undeniable importance as a part of the overall PIM process. Country 
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experiences suggested that implementation problems are often due to procurement challenges 
rather than to poor selection of projects and budgeting (Rajaram et al., 2014). To facilitate 
procurement, an accounting system – capable of capturing and reporting all project costs 
instead of tracking separate contracts or stages against annual appropriations – is required in 
order to manage the total cost of projects over their life. Meanwhile, fund allocation for the 
implementation over a project’s life cycle is facilitated by multiyear budgeting as it reduces 
future uncertainty through ensuring a predictable flow of finances. 
2.1.6 Adjustment of projects. 
An essential element of an efficient PIM is the flexibility of the annual budgeting 
process to capture changes in project circumstances and to allow changes in the disbursement 
profile accordingly. For instance, the funding requests should reflect any cost increase which 
are caused due to delays in project implementation. There should be an arrangement through 
the process of funding approval or monitoring to ask project sponsors for reformulation of the 
project or even halting fund disbursements if project cost escalates to the point where it is no 
longer beneficial (Rajaram et al., 2010). This approach indicates towards carrying out of 
funding in phases, and in accordance with the cost-benefit analysis of discrete phases. This 
approach will increase the efficiency of investment through identifying the wasteful projects 
and adjusting the annual budgets allocation accordingly. 
Further, the nature of the monitoring process can be reinforced by these funding 
mechanisms, making it active rather than passive. Governments can increase the proactivity of 
their project monitoring system through enhancing the capacity and addressing the 
implementation problems as soon as they are identified. Comparing project progress against 
the implementation plan would be the central task of monitoring (Rajaram et al., 2014). Both 
financial and physical progress of projects need to be audited by monitoring agencies based on 
the progress reports that will be submitted by the implementing agencies on a mandatory basis.    
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2.1.7 Facility operation. 
A desirable component of guaranteeing that the purpose is served by the new public 
assets over their active lifetime is active monitoring. A process should be there to safeguard 
that an asset, once it completed, is prepared for operation and delivering services. An effective 
mechanism is required by this process for (a) responsibility transfer with regard to the 
management of asset operation and maintenance in future, and (b) ensuring sufficient funding 
sources for the operation and maintenance of these newly created assets (Rajaram et al., 2010). 
However, verifying the extent of post-completion adaptation or additional outlay requirement 
by the newly completed facility is also important in case they are not suitable for service 
delivery and still lie idle. In addition, maintaining asset registers and recording asset values are 
equally important. This suggests the need for tracking service delivery related to facility 
operation through time and by both quantity and quality. Moreover, institutions should be held 
accountable for results who are responsible for service delivery.    
2.1.8 Basic review and evaluation of completed projects. 
Finally, an often missing but essential feature of PIM systems is a basic completion 
review and evaluation of projects (Rajaram et al., 2014). A systematic way needs to be followed 
to conduct basic completion review of all projects. It involves an examination sometime after 
the project completion by a responsible agency or line ministry, comprising (a) whether the 
project was finished within the original (or revised) time frame and budget, and (b) whether 
the project delivered the intended output. In addition, an audit of a sample of investment 
projects should be conducted by a supreme audit institution as a supplement to this basic 
completion review.     
Ex-post project evaluation should compare the outputs and outcomes of projects against 
the set of objectives documented in the project plan. This process is highly selective and is 
usually carried out after project completion with a time lag of two to five years. Good practice 
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suggests that future project design and implementation can be improved through lessons 
learned from such ex-post evaluations (Rajaram et al., 2010). Therefore, for example, if during 
the evaluation it is found that the procurement processes led to costly delays, it should drive 
the agencies to address the problem as a systemic remedy.  
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CHAPTER 3 
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE PIM OF BANGLAGESH AGAINST THE EIGHT 
FEATURES 
 
This chapter covers a detailed assessment (gap analysis) of the functioning of 
Bangladesh’s PIM system against eight essential features of the PIM system, as set out in the 
previous chapter. The assessment is also supported by analysis of system’s performance on 
quantitative indicators based on available data. Though, the assessment is concentrated on 
public investment by the central government, with a particular focus on the ADP, it also 
incorporates the relevant NDB. 
3.1 Guidance to Investment, Development and Preliminary Screening of Projects 
3.1.1 National plans and strategies exist, but connection between them and the 
ADP is weak.  
Bangladesh has a number of national development plans and strategy documents, 
including a long-term perspective plan, Vision 2021, the National Strategy for Accelerated 
Poverty Reduction II (NSAPR II 2009-11), the Seventh Five Year Plan (7FYP 2016-2020), 
and medium term budgetary strategy set out in the Medium Term Budgetary Frameworks 
(MTBFs). However, at the sector level, World Bank (2010) found “while sector policy 
frameworks are in place and appear to be appropriately formulated, intra-sector budget 
allocations and usage do not always reflect the sector’s policy, revealing a passive 
budgeting/allocation stance”. This provides an indication towards weak connections between 
strategy documents and the actual resource allocation for ADP projects. It also reflects a 
budgeting process that is largely incremental and bottom-up where often new project proposals 
are generated following informal processes (World Bank, 2011).  
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3.1.2 The level of project formulation capacity in agencies is low.  
Except a few agencies, most agencies lack the required capacity to prepare a sound 
project log-frame. Agencies usually focus on inputs and outputs in their project proposals, 
while the outcomes and intended impacts of those projects, and the alternative means of 
achieving intended outcomes get inadequate attention. As World Bank (2011) stated, due to 
the unavailability of detailed guidance on project formulation to agencies, many projects are 
formulated without pre-feasibility and/or feasibility studies.  
3.1.3 The project screening capacity of respective authorities is generally low.  
The planning units in the respective line ministries (LMs) conduct the first screening of 
proposals developed by agencies during the year. These planning wings often fail to effectively 
screen out low quality proposals at the early development stage due to the lack of adequate 
manpower and training in project appraisal (World Bank, 2011). Time pressures and informal 
pressures to pass proposals on to the Planning Commission (PC) are two other factors that they 
face. The second preliminary screening takes place during the annual budget round after a large 
number of new project proposals are put forward by agencies and LMs for consideration. These 
proposals consist of only a two-page description and often only a one-line project title (World 
Bank 2011). At the meeting of the Programming Committee of PC, these projects are screened 
for inclusion in the ADP on a list of “unapproved new projects without allocations”. This 
practice of including unapproved projects in the ADP over the years have been sustaining due 
to a limited number of proposals of better quality projects, continued pressure to maintain a 
predetermined ADP size, and the provisions that allow spending for unapproved projects based 
on recommendations by the PC (World Bank and Asian Development Bank, 2003). All these 
factors contributed to double the number of unapproved new projects in the ADP since 2007-
08, increasing from 402 in 2007-08, to 857 in 2015-16 (CPD, 2015).  
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3.2 Formal Appraisal of Projects 
3.2.1 The formal guideline on technical aspects of project appraisal is not 
available to project development officials.  
The policy guidelines issued by the PC for framing the ADP for a fiscal year only cover 
procedural aspects with regard to developing project proposals. However, any technical 
guidelines substantive issues, for instance how to conduct cost benefit analysis (CBA) appear 
to be missing at the sector or sub-sector level (World Bank, 2011).  
3.2.2 Project appraisal capacity at agency and ministry level is relatively weak.  
Over the last two decades, the formal project appraisal capacity has been weakening 
gradually in Bangladesh. Apart from a very few agencies such as Local Government 
Engineering Department (LGED) and the Power Cell, agencies in general have weak capacities 
in developing project proposals based on sound appraisal, including the use of CBA (World 
Bank, 2011). There is a requirement to prepare a detailed development project proforma (DPP) 
for investment projects or technical project proforma (TPP) for technical assistance (TA) 
projects, where the project costs, financing, as well as the implementation plans and risks are 
required to be assessed carefully. However, World Bank (2010, 2011) found an often 
superficial level of rationality analysis of the overall project, and the CBA of alternative 
options. Inadequate formal technical training for officials coupled with frequent within and 
between PC and LM transfers of officials are considered as the major factors behind such weak 
capacity of project appraisal.  
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3.3 Independent review of appraisal 
3.3.1 PEC lacks in-depth independent review capacity.  
The Project Evaluation Committee (PEC) meetings are attended by officials from 
different ministries/divisions1, chaired by the Member of the Planning Commission in charge 
of the relevant sector. Prior to submission to the PEC, approval by a Committee chaired by the 
Additional Secretary, FD is required where either implementation or operating manpower 
salary costs are involved. While the procedural aspects, the costs, and to some extent the 
possible social and environmental impacts of projects are thoroughly reviewed by the PEC, the 
underlying project rationality and possible alternatives are not adequately scrutinized (World 
Bank, 2011). The capacity of PEC is also inadequate to review the log-frames, and the quality 
of CBA for those projects2 where expected economic rates of returns are estimated by the 
sponsoring agency. Furthermore, some arbitrary changes are made at times by PEC or 
approving authority to project parameters without considering whether the decision is feasible 
or financially viable, e.g. reducing the number of project completion years on the priority basis.  
3.3.2 Independent appraisal review of DP projects by the government are 
limited.  
In order to submit to the PEC and Executive Committee of the National Economic 
Council (ECNEC), all development partner (DP) investment and TA projects are required to 
be prepared in the same format as GOB projects since 2005 (World Bank, 2010). Due to the 
limited capacity in government agencies, LMs, or the PC, to independently appraise the quality 
of DP projects, often these DPP/TPPs are contracted out by agencies to local consultants for 
preparation. Such contracting may lead to reduced local ownership and increased project risk. 
                                                 
1  These include the Executing Agency (EA), their Sponsoring Ministry (SM), General Economics 
Division (GED), Programming Division, the relevant sector Division of the PC, the Finance Division (FD), the 
Economic Relations Division (ERD) of MoF, Ministry of Public Administration, Ministry of Environment and 
Forest, Ministry of Women’s Affairs, and IMED. 
2 Mainly energy and transport sector projects. 
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In addition to the quality, there is only limited analysis on other important issues such as 
whether the government can afford the future operating and maintenance costs of the completed 
assets.  
3.4 Project Selection and Budgeting  
3.4.1 Absence of inventory of appraised projects and electronic database of all 
ADP projects.  
DPPs are submitted to the PEC regularly by some sectors during the year, while others 
pile up their DPPs and submit them towards the end of the fiscal year. This practice creates 
imbalance for the review and selection system. Projects with estimated costs of BDT 250 
million or less are submitted to the Minister for Planning, and to ECNEC with estimated costs 
more than BDT 250 million, for final approval after being recommended by PEC (World Bank, 
2011). Projects are selected for financing in the ADP upon getting ECNEC’s approval. ECNEC 
make these decisions project by project and without having information of their individual and 
cumulative impact on the current and midterm ADP portfolio cost. This lack of information 
about the expected aggregate cost over the medium term is caused by absence of an electronic 
database of all the projects in the ADP. During the annual budget round in April/May, the 
budget financing decisions are taken for all on-going and new ADP projects (World Bank, 
2010).  
3.4.2 FD sets an aggregate ceiling at the start of the annual budget cycle.  
In the context of the Medium Term Fiscal Framework (MTFF), the fiscal forecasts are 
prepared and the preliminary envelope for total NDB/ADP spending are set by FD. FD, then 
gives agencies/LMs a preliminary expenditure ceiling and ask them to prepare a Ministry 
Budget Framework (MBF) under the MTBF system. A tripartite meeting attended by FD, PC, 
EA/SM finalize the MBFs and budget ceilings. Then funds are allocated between NDBs and 
ADP by EAs under the supervision of SMs/LMs.  
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3.4.3 Domestically-financed projects are selected on ad-hoc basis.  
Due to enormous pressure put by informal channels to agencies, LMs and the PC to 
include projects, a bulk of proposals for “unapproved new projects without allocation” can be 
found particularly for infrastructure construction projects in the ADP/RADP round in 
February-April each year. These unapproved new projects thereby get the authorization to be 
proceeded to full DPPs for PEC/ECNEC consideration during the following FY. This practice 
is very pervasive over the last decade and it is very hard to find a new project into the 
ADP/RADP unless it was included in the previous ADP/RADP. However, this is an 
improvement on the situation, considering a large number of new projects, generated 
informally, entered directly into the ADP prior to 2003-04 (World Bank, 2011).  
3.4.4. For TA projects, there is a set of delegation in place.  
Departmental Special Project Evaluation Committee (DSPEC), chaired by the 
concerned Secretary of the Sponsoring Ministry/Division are responsible for processing TA 
projects with estimated costs up to BDT 70 million. Then the concerned Minister approve these 
TA projects following the recommendations of the DSPEC. However, Minister for Planning 
approve TA projects, with an estimated cost of over BDT 70 million, after Special Project 
Evaluation Committee’s consideration.  
3.4.5 ADP is comprised of a large number of projects, including a high 
proportion of small projects.  
The total number of ADP projects in FY2016 was 998, which increased to 1557 projects 
(56 per cent increase) in the RADP of the same FY (see Appendix 1). This indicates that there 
is a high probability of additional new projects in the ADP in the same FY when it is revised. 
Meanwhile, the practice of adding small and symbolic (the minimum allocation to keep the 
project in the ADP list) projects has become more pervasive in recent years. CPD (2016a) in 
their budget analysis found that, in FY2017, 18 projects under ADP received only BDT 0.1 
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million (14 projects received such allocation in FY2016) while 8 out of those 18 projects are 
from Transport sector. Further, under ADP in FY2016, 31 investment projects from 12 sectors 
received only BDT 10 million or less (CPD, 2016a). In most cases, these discrete projects with 
same objective and same implementing agency (e.g. Transport sector) could be combined into 
a single larger project. In contrast, sector-wide program (e.g. health and primary education) 
type projects contain a large number of sub-projects/components that constitute separate 
projects in other occasions. 
3.4.6 Funding is slashed and reallocated in RADP due to underutilization.  
In March, each year, a mid-year review of the implementation status of the ADP takes 
place. In the backdrop of under-execution each year, funding are slashed in RADP from ADP. 
In addition, significant amount of funds are reallocated from under-spent projects to well-spent 
projects to facilitate them to spend the additional fund in the last few months of the FY. Annex 
1 shows that in contrast to increasing number of projects, funds are reduced (6.6 per cent in 
FY2016) in RADP compared to ADP in each fiscal year. This reflects LM/agency’s poor 
quality projections of their budget requirements, as well as RADP’s impact on the sectoral and 
overall resource distribution in the ADP.  
3.4.7 Projects, expected to be completed in the next year, are given priority in 
funding decisions. 
Both the ADP and RADP encompass a list of projects that are scheduled to be 
completed within the FY as per project timeline. According to recent ADP circulars issued by 
the PC in the last quarter of FY, there is a clear indication that on-going projects, scheduled for 
completion during the following FY, should be given priority (World Bank, 2011). However, 
once funds are made for priority areas, not enough funding space is left in the ADP to fully 
meet all on-going projects’ disbursement requirements. This causes under-funding of many 
 28 
 
projects compared to their DPP disbursement profile (expected), leading to time and cost 
escalation of many ADP projects.  
3.4.8 There is no clear definition of the margins of the ADP and the NDB.  
While some capital expenditures are outside the ADP and the normal project review 
process owing to historical reasons, similar to most development assistance receiving countries 
there are also elements of recurrent expenditure in the ADP. Perhaps this resulted in a confusion 
between capital and recurrent and “ADP and Revenue” expenditures and ambiguity over the 
use of key fiscal terminologies such as capital and current expenditures (World Bank, 2010).  
3.5 Project Implementation  
3.5.1 Project directors do not have a comprehensive manual on project 
implementation.  
As is found from literature review, having an implementation manual available to 
project directors is regarded as a good practice where project management requirements and 
processes, both are covered comprehensively. In Bangladesh, project directors do not have 
such a comprehensive manual. Indeed, delay in appointing project directors is often cited by 
officials as one of the major causes of delayed start of projects.  
3.5.2 Implementing agencies do not face problems with regard to availability 
and timeliness of their allocated funds.  
In recent years, no in-year cash shortages were experienced by GOB as faced by many 
other countries during project implementation. FD has also given the authority to LMs and 
agencies to spend against their allocation in July/August each year, covering the first three 
quarters of the year. Thus, delay in fund release which was a major cause of day in Bangladesh 
in the past, no longer a cause today. Funding of larger projects, due to their phase wise design, 
are linked to previous phase(s)’s completion.  
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3.5.3 Procurement remains a major area of concern despite showing signs of 
improvement.  
With regard to procurement, a major achievement was the enactment and 
implementation of the Public Procurement Act 2006, together with Public Procurement Rules 
2008 (revised in 2009). Preparation and practice of standard tender document, establishment 
and institutionalization of the Central Procurement Technical Unit (CPTU) and a procurement 
complaints mechanism, and implementation of capacity building programs with DP assistance 
are some of the positive features in procurement of Bangladesh. There is also sign of quality 
improvement of annual procurement plans. However, major areas of concern include 
“collusion amongst bidders, breaking down of tenders into smaller amounts to get under 
thresholds, and inappropriate involvement of senior decision makers in tendering” (World 
Bank, 2011). Furthermore, project directors usually have no procurement related experience or 
training.  
3.5.4 Evidence of ‘fourth quarter syndrome’. 
ADP suffers from the chronic problem of low implementation rate for the first three 
quarters with a large jump in spending in the final quarter (April-June) of the FY, especially in 
June. It raises the question about spending quality (CPD, 2016b). Figure 1 shows that during 
FY2006-16, around 41 per cent of the total ADP allocation was spent in the last quarter on an 
average while the corresponding proportion was only 9-17 per cent for the first three quarters 
of FY. More than 23 per cent of total ADP allocation was spent in June alone which is the final 
month of FY in Bangladesh. Despite such spike in the last quarter 16.2 of ADP allocation was 
unutilized on an average during the aforesaid period. 
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Figure 1. Pattern of quarterly ADP implementation as against original allocation, FY2006-16. 
Adapted from State of the Bangladesh Economy in FY2015-16: Third Reading, by 
CPD, 2016b, Dhaka: Centre for Policy Dialogue. 
The main cause of delays in implementation, as identified in IMED reports include, 
delays in procurement, land acquisition, and appointment of project personnel, frequent change 
of project directors, insufficient monitoring, and untimely adjustments to projects (World 
Bank, 2011).  
3.5.4 DP-funded projects have lower execution rate than GOB projects.  
The average execution rate of PA allocations (72 per cent) in ADP, is significantly 
lower than that of GOB allocations (89 per cent) during FY2001-16 period (figure 2). The trend 
reversed a little during FY2006-08, particularly during the rule of the caretaker government, 
but could not sustain and moved back to its previous trend since FY2009.  
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Figure 2. Components of ADP implementation as against original allocation, FY2001-16. 
Calculated from the Implementation Monitoring and Evaluation Division data. 
This phenomenon in case of DP-financed projects can be explained by a mismatch in 
expectations between the authorities and DPs over the procurement related requirement. 
Procurement is reported as a major source of delay in implementing DP projects as 
requirements often vary according to the preferences of DPs.  
3.5.5 High ADP fund spending, but low real physical performance.  
A large number of projects are declared as completed every fiscal year. However, 
financial progress does not necessarily lead to physical progress and can be very different. 
Financial progress is often considered as a proxy measure for assessing implementation 
progress. However, in reality actual physical progress status can be very different from 
spending of funds. Figure 3 shows that during FY2001-FY2016 period, around 65 per cent 
projects (on an average) were stated as complete while their physical progress was not 100 per 
cent. Thus, the overall quality of ADP implementation is often compromised.  
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Figure 3. Percentage of completed projects that are not 100 per cent physically completed. 
Calculated from the Implementation Monitoring and Evaluation Division data. 
Insufficient monitoring of physical progress by implementing agencies and their LMs, 
and insufficient response to the identified problems are some of factors behind such 
discrepancy.  
3.6 Project Adjustment  
3.6.1 Project revision and adjustment system is present with some rigidities.  
Broadly, for both GOB and DP-financed projects, a project may be revised during 
implementation through formal approval of a revised DPP/TPP only twice. Some discipline is 
introduced through this system to maintain original DPP’s relevance, and limit arbitrariness in 
making changes to projects during implementation. However, such a system also presents some 
rigidities in changing circumstances during implementation, particularly reflected by the 
indication of PC of not allowing retroactive approval for adjustments. This has resulted in some 
procurement problems as a lowly evaluated tender, more than the DPP/ TPP provision, cannot 
be accepted by procuring entities, disregarding its market price compatibility. Such rigidity has 
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prompted the implementing agencies to group all the changes that they think necessary, and 
seek approval for the collective changes in one adjustment (World Bank, 2011).  
3.6.2 Project revisions seldom prompt a re-appraisal of the continued 
justification of projects.  
According to the PC Circular, thorough reviews are required for revised projects with 
unusual increase of excessive cost. However, no such review of project’s continued 
justification, redesign or cancellation takes place where a project seriously exceeds its cost or 
lags behind from its schedule, or where the final service demand from a project has 
fundamentally changed.  
3.7 Facility Operation  
3.7.1 Delays and difficulties in operating and maintenance of newly completed 
assets.  
Delays in transferring payments/salaries for officials/staff, from ADP (capital budget) 
to the NDB (recurrent budget) after project completion cause delays in newly completed 
facility operation. Moreover, apart from registers of agencies office furniture and equipment 
type small items, asset registers are not kept by LMs. This makes the assessment of the 
requirements as well as the adequacy of current funding for maintenance and rehabilitation 
difficult.  
3.7.2 Despite the lack of systematic data, evidences of low quality facilities after 
project completion are frequent.  
Not systematic data on asset quality after completion are generated monitoring system. 
However, anecdotal references such as “bridges without roads” and “roads without bridges” 
are not too hard to find. Infrastructure Investment Facilitation Center (IIFC) in their report 
states: “There are many instances of projects including railway, factory, irrigation, barrage, and 
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textile and jute mill projects where projects were abandoned after completion with colossal loss 
of public funds” (World Bank, 2011). Other examples of such cases are also cited by IIFC: “It 
is well known that Raujan Power Plant (2 units) was completed much before the gas was ready 
for the plants. Many hospital facilities were created where either necessary equipment or 
manpower were not ready” (World Bank, 2011). 
3.8 Basic Completion Review and Evaluation  
3.8.1 Project completion reviews are completed systematically, and there is a 
comprehensive database of statistics on completed projects.  
It is a perquisite to submit a detailed project completion report (PCR) by project directors, 
within three months of the project completion according to IMED specified detailed template. 
The template covers allocation (original and revised), costs, and timeliness, project personnel, 
financing, procurement, the achievement of objectives, analysis of benefits, and post-
implementation analysis (World Bank, 2011). However, average compliance rate is around 60 
per cent (table 1). In addition, often PCRs, submitted to the IMED are not fully complete. 
Table 1. 
Status of PCR submission, FY2013-15 
FY Number of completed 
projects 
PCR 
submitted 
PCR not 
submitted 
% of total 
completed 
projects 
FY13 206 134 72 65.0 
FY14 233 141 92 60.5 
FY15 240 141 99 58.8 
Note. Adapted from State of the Bangladesh Economy in FY2016 (Second Reading), by CPD, 
2016c, Dhaka: Centre for Policy Dialogue. 
 
As IMED use these PCRs for analytical purpose, non-submission hampers this 
evaluation process. Further, the monthly and annual recommendations by IMED based on these 
reports on performance of completed projects are not adequately followed up.  
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3.8.2 There are large average cost and (especially) time overruns on completed 
projects.  
In recent years, cost and time overrun for completed ADP projects has become a 
common trend. Figure 4 shows that only 14 per cent out of 233 completed projects were 
completed within scheduled time and estimated cost in FY2014, which the lowest since 
FY2001. Among the completed projects, 48.9 per cent could not be finish within the stipulated 
timeline.  
  
Figure 4. Cost and time overrun (%) of concluded projects, FY2001-14. Calculated from the 
Implementation Monitoring and Evaluation Division data. 
Among the completed projects in FY2014, average years that projects took to complete 
was 5 years as against the planned 2.9 years (see Appendix 2). Due to this time overrun, average 
project cost for all concluded projects increased to 51.1 per cent, highest since FY2006.  
3.8.3 Number of audits, project evaluation and impact evaluation have 
increased, but follow up is weak.  
The regularity audits are completed by the Comptroller and Auditor General’s Office 
(C&AG) which focus on individual transaction, rather than on PFM’s soundness. To audit DP-
financed projects, a separate unit has been established within C&AG – the Foreign Assisted 
Projects Audit Directorate (FAPAD). Some DPs accept FAPAD’s audits, while private 
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international audit companies are hired for other DPs to audit their projects (World Bank, 
2011). Sometimes, concerned government agencies are forced to follow up serious audit 
objection in cases where DPs withhold their disbursement. The C&AG began to conduct a 
small number of performance audits in 2009.  
Moreover, IMED conducts approximately 6-15 impact evaluation each year of selected 
projects (table 2). Also, the number of audits and completed project evaluation by IMED 
officials increased substantially both in FY2009-10 and FY2012-15 periods. However, due to 
limited manpower and expertise, IMED cannot conduct impact evaluation for a majority of 
projects. 
Table 2. 
Accounts of completed project evaluation, FY2008-15 
FY Total number of 
projects 
Number of audits Number of 
evaluation of 
completed 
projects 
Impact 
evaluation 
FY08 1058 608 178 9 
FY09 1040 710 228 7 
FY10 1090 1053 314 6 
FY11 1193 N/A N/A N/A 
FY12 1340 912 251 10 
FY13 1328 1178 N/A 22 
FY14 1366 951 276 14 
FY15 1458 1302 N/A 15 
Note. N/A = Not applicable. 
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CHAPTER 4  
FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 
4.1 Findings 
Identifying the components of the system that are hampering the marginal performance 
is the key strategic issue assessment of PIM system. On the basis of diagnosis in Chapter 3, the 
critical weaknesses in delivery of the ADP in Bangladesh currently are found to be: 
 Weaknesses in technical capacity related to identification, formulation, and 
appraisal of quality projects. Officials at all levels in Bangladesh, agencies, LMs and 
the PC, don’t have adequate technical capacity of preparing and appraising ADP 
projects. With the exception of some expertise in few selected agencies, project 
formulation, independent review and appraisal are done by the PC in a superficial way. 
This absence of required in-depth technical rigor often results in poor quality projects 
and non-alignment with country priorities. This is critically important for large 
infrastructure projects anticipated to generate large scale impact. 
 Weaknesses in the project screening and selection, and effectiveness of budgeting 
for their implementation. The continuation of informal practices in the initial proposal 
screening of new projects result in the inclusion too many projects in the ADP. The 
project by project approval practice by ECNEC during the year for including in the 
ADP without information of their impact on the individual and aggregate ADP portfolio 
cost leads to inefficiency. Further, under-funding of on-going projects due to systemic 
causes contributes to project completion delays and cost escalation. There is also not 
much effort in ensuring adequate budget for the future operation and maintenance of 
completed projects.  
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 Low quality of implementation of the projects. Although improvement was achieved 
in the quantity of spending, particularly for GOB projects, the quality of spending 
remain a major area of concern. Weaknesses associated with project implementation 
include procurement related delays and informal practices, inadequate physical 
progress monitoring, and persistent evidence of the fourth quarter spike. In addition, 
low rate of DP-funded ADP projects mainly due to delays caused by DPs procurement 
related complications. 
 Lack of attention to newly created facilities. The investment cycle is systematically 
neglected in the ADP modelled PIM system of Bangladesh due to its overwhelming 
focus on the project cycle. Put it differently, Bangladesh focus overwhelmingly on 
annual budget spending and project completion, and overlook the central public 
investment objective of creating new assets in order to deliver higher quality services 
to its citizens. Further attention is needed to ensure that these costly new assets are not 
wasted and serves the fundamental objective of public investment. 
4.2 Policy Recommendations 
This section presents a summary of recommendations for strengthening the 
effectiveness of PIM system in Bangladesh. It also coincides with recommendations of IMED, 
stated in their implementation progress reports from FY2009 to FY2013. It also accommodates 
Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD) recommendations (different years) on different ADP 
implementation problems. 
Planning and Approval Phase. 
 Conducting feasibility study and preparation of detailed design before preparing 
Development Project Proposal (DPP) (IMED, 2009). Logical Framework of projects 
should be properly made and included in project document (IMED, 2014). Necessary 
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allocation should be made according to DPP under MTBF keeping number of projects 
at a rational level (IMED, 2011).  
 Seasonality, weather and other natural issues should be considered while preparing 
work plan (IMED, 2012). 
Procurement and implementation phase. 
 Procurement activities could be done in advance in some instances (IMED, 2009). 
Intense training for every procurement office head and procurement related officers on 
public procurement act and rules should be continued. Regular analysis should be done 
on annual procurement plan and should be updated if necessary (IMED, 2012). 
 Initial steps of land acquisition should be taken based on feasibility study before project 
preparation (IMED, 2009). An outline on increasing loses due to land acquisition could 
be prepared by land ministry. Besides, upward enhancing policy could be adopted and 
implemented to reduce the use of land (IMED, 2014).  
 Tendering and other necessary work should start at the beginning of the fiscal year 
through making time based work plan (IMED, 2014).  
 Necessary manpower should be recruited as per DPPs including joint chief in large and 
important ministry/divisions to achieve desired competency (CPD, 2009, IMED, 2014). 
Like other project matters, manpower related matter should also be recommended by 
the PEC instead of manpower selection committee of finance division (IMED, 2012).  
 ECNEC should be discouraged to change project directors frequently and project 
directors should be discouraged to lead more than one project (IMED, 2011). All 
projects should have full time project directors (CPD, 2009). A ‘Project Director Pool’ 
consisting of expert and experience project directors of different sectors can be 
formulated under IMED direction (IMED, 2009).  
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 GOB should be cautious while negotiating conditions that will be problematic during 
implementation (IMED, 2009). 
Monitoring and evaluation phase. 
 Close monitoring should be done by every ministry/division to ensure quality of project 
works. Administrative capacity of ministries/divisions should be increased to monitor 
project preparation and implementation. IMED should be strengthened at different 
monitoring stage for ensuring adequate qualitative and quantitative monitoring of the 
implementation (CPD, 2010, IMED, 2011).  
 In order to understand the real implementation situation (physical progress), the PCRs 
should also be made public. Also, impact analysis of selective types of projects needs 
to be initiated to prioritize the approval of future projects (CPD, 2011). PCRs should 
be prepared and submitted to IMED in proper time (IMED, 2011, 2014). An inter-
ministerial committee could be formulated to maintain coherence in different ministry 
reports as much as possible (CPD, 2016c).  
4.3 Conclusion 
To achieve middle-income country status by 2021, Bangladesh requires increased 
public investment, particularly in order to close severe education, health, and infrastructure 
gaps. The major proportion of public investment in Bangladesh is channeled through the 
Annual Development Program (ADP). The current study attempted to assess the key factors 
affecting the effectiveness of ADP delivery in Bangladesh against a sound PIM framework. 
The assessment of this study found a weak project screening and appraisal status in the 
project preparation stage. This is supported by the finding of inadequate independent review of 
project proposals (e.g. log frames and CBA), as well as the practice of pervasive and increasing 
allocations to symbolic (small) projects and the substantial growth in the number of unapproved 
new projects (which doubled between FY2008 and FY2016). Moreover, the unapproved new 
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projects in previous fiscal years may lead to further growth in the number of symbolic projects 
in the ADP in the coming years, putting further pressure and perhaps exacerbate resources for 
the already under-funded on-going projects. 
Although a significant improvement has been achieved in the ADP execution rate in 
the last two decades particularly for GOB projects (89 per cent), the execution rate of DP 
assisted projects (72 per cent) lags far behind. Furthermore, the evidence of fourth quarter 
syndrome suggests significant potential problems regarding the spending quality, and therefore 
the continued presence of project preparation and implementation weaknesses. In addition, the 
large share of projects which were declared completed despite not being 100 per cent complete 
indicates the necessity of reviewing and rationalizing quality of ADP spending. 
Two key indicators for evaluating the PIM system effectiveness are cost and time over-
run. While some the average cost overrun showed some improvement in recent years, the 
average cost overrun is still on an increasing trend. Weaknesses in project preparation, 
financing, and execution are likely to have contributed to such inefficiency.  
Finally, inadequate follow-up on the recommendations generated from external audits, 
as well as IMED impact evaluations and lack of attention to the operation and maintenance of 
newly created assets are the two other critically important factors which hamper the efficacy 
of ADP delivery of Bangladesh. Therefore, the currents study recommends that these 
weaknesses should be addressed in the short, medium and long term to increase the 
effectiveness of PIM system in Bangladesh. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
Comparison between ADP and RADP, by number of projects and allocation, FY2006-16 
FY Number of Projects   % of 
increase 
Allocation % of 
decrease ADP RADP ADP RADP 
FY06 859 1,081 25.8 24,500 21,500 -14.0 
FY07 886 1,098 23.9 26,000 21,600 -20.4 
FY08 931 1,058 13.6 26,500 22,500 -17.8 
FY09 904 1,040 15.0 25,600 23,000 -11.3 
FY10 886 1,090 23.0 30,500 28,500 -7.0 
FY11 916 1,193 30.2 38,500 35,880 -7.3 
FY12 1,039 1,340 29.0 46,000 41,080 -12.0 
FY13 1,037 1,328 28.1 55,000 52,366 -5.0 
FY14 1,046 1,366 30.6 65,872 60,000 -9.8 
FY15 1,034 1,458 41.0 80,315 75,000 -7.1 
FY16 998 1,557 56.0 97,000 91,000 -6.6 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
Cost over-run and time over-run of completed projects, FY2003-14 
FY No. of 
concluded 
projects 
Average 
implementation 
period (year) 
(% 
increase) 
Average project cost 
(Million BDT) 
(% 
increase) 
Planned Actual Project 
Cost 
Expenditure 
FY03 169 3.0 5.6 86.0 465 836 79.9 
FY04 232 3.7 6.8 85.5 609 826 35.6 
FY05 164 3.7 7.1 95.1 706 1,024 45.0 
FY06 225 3.9 7.2 84.6 783 1,435 83.2 
FY07 181 4.6 7.6 67.5 1,526 2,066 35.5 
FY08 239 3.7 6.4 75.2 911 1,200 31.6 
FY09 173 3.2 5.8 78.4 654 873 33.4 
FY10 195 3.5 6.3 80.4 1,089 1,370 25.8 
FY11 257 3.5 6.2 77.9 1,156 1,493 29.1 
FY12 199 3.3 5.3 63.8 889 1,151 29.5 
FY13 206 2.9 5.3 81.6 1,062 1,416 33.4 
FY14 233 2.9 5.0 74.4 793 1,198 51.1 
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